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IN TRODUCIION

The purpose of this paper is to report on research that
was done in an area of manpower development programs in which
little analysis has been done.

During the last decade there

were many developments in the area of federal manpower programs.
Two of these developments were the Manpower Development and
Training Act (MDTA) and the Work Incentive Program (WIN).

They

provide training for new workers as well as retraining for workers
displaced by technology.

This paper will try and show that grad

uates of the WIN program are financially more successful than those
of the MOTA program.

Also, this paper will test eight variables to

determine upon what the success of public aid recipients is dependent.
Chapter I is a brief history of vocational education and
retraining programs in the United States.

The development of, as well

as the reason for, vocational education and retraining are discussed
along with a review of the amounts of money spent on vocational edu
cation.
Chapter II deals exclusively with the Manpower Development
and Training Act.

First, there is a short history of MIJrA followed

by a discussion of institutional training and on-the-job training.
A sununary of the objectives of the MDTA program and a review of MDTA
studies dealing with the social costs and benefits of MDTA programs
are also included in this chapter.

1
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Chapter III is a summary of the Work Incentive Program.
In this chapter the history of the WIN program is discussed along
with the responsibilities of the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare (HEW) and the Department of Labor (DOL) in promoting
the program.

The final section of this chapter outlines new

changes in the WIN program.
Chapter IV is concerned with the statement of the hypotheses
to be tested in this paper and the source and type of data that was
used in the tests.
Chapter V is the presentation of the findings�obtained from
the various statistical tests that were made.
Chapter VI is the concluding chapter and has some final
connn ents on the findings as well as suggestions for further research.

CHAPTER I

HISTORY OF TRAIN ING PROGRAMS

Vocational Education
The idea of vocational education has been with us since
ancient times.

Then, it was usually a father-son tradition and

training was by observation and imitation.

When the world began

to change rapidly, especially after the industrial revolution,
there was no guarantee that a son would follow his f ather's pro
f ession, so some system of training was necessary.
The Morrill Act of 1862 was the first Federal plan to help
the vocational training system in America.

The Morrill Act made

land grants available to state colleges that were devoted to the
agricultural and mechanical arts to enable them to provide liberal
and practical education to the industrial classes.

Not until after

the Civil War were high schools of much importance to vocational
education.

They were strictly college preparatory schools and were

not necessarily f our-year institutions.

When more and better high

schools came into existence, colleges began upgrading their curricula.
At this time a college education was comparable to a good present
day high school education.

High schools gradually became four-

year institutions because colleges gradually began upgrading their

3
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As

curricula and demanding four years of high school for admission.
the colleges upgraded their studies, high schools had to fill the
void lef t in vocational education when colleges moved into highly
skilled and professional f ields.

For example, college courses in

f arming became agricultural science and mechanical arts became
engineering .

Therefore, high schools began to fill in at the inter

mediate levels.
Vocational education bills were passed in Congress every year
between 1906 and 1913, but none were really satisfactory.

The quality

of American vocational education still lagged behind that of Europe.
It wasn't until the Commission on N ational Aid to Vocational Education
was formed in 1914 that a substantial move was made to help vocational
education.

Through the work of this commission came the V ocational

Education Act of 1917 or the Smith-Hughes Act.

This bit of legislation

was meant to bring American training standards up to those of Europe.
The Smith-Hughes Act allowed $7 million annually for vocational educa
tion and this same amount is still allotted today.

Prior to 1963 and

the Vocational Education Act of that year, various other bills added
$40 million to the yearly sum for vocational education.

Total 1963

Federal appropriations for vocational and technical education were
over $57 million.
The goal of vocational education has not been solely to supply
industry with the amounts and types of skilled labor it needs.

Voca

tional education also helps to eliminate unemployment problems .

It

5

does this by providing skilled training at the high school level to
young people who will soon be entering the job market.

Because of

our fast-paced society and neglect of minority groups, however, a
new unemployment problem has arisen.

Some groups of people, especi-

ally the ghetto poor and older workers, cannot obtain good vocational
education and those already trained are losing their jobs because of
technological changes in industry.

Large numbers of people, there

fore, are unemployed because they lack appropriate training.

1

Retraining
Structural unemployment problems were considered to be national
problems by Congress in the 1960's.

The " Holland Subconunittee on

Unemployment and Impact of Automation, " a part of the "U. S. Congress
House of Representatives Committee on Education and Labor," confirmed
that unemployment was the nation's most pressing problem.

Even though

industry, labor and local governments did have employment programs,
the unemployment problem was too great for them to handle alone.

The

labor market, after all, is a national market and national leadership
is required to meet its needs.

The Holland Subcommittee also said

that hard-core structural unemployment "appeared to be on the increase . "
With rising unemployment, measures needed to b e taken on a nation-wide
scale.

Training and retraining were recognized as essential remedies

1
Facts in the preceding section taken from Grant Venn, Man,
Education and Work (American Council on Education: Washington, D.C.,
1964), pp. 38-6 1 .

6

by the "Joint Economic Committee of Congress."

Retraining the unem-

ployed and especially the unemployed on welfare became a nation-wide
2
.
.
priority.
Retraining for welfare recipients made good sense because
poverty, welfare and unemployment are closely allied.

Welfare

recipients have social and psychological problems that tend to add
up causing them to be marginal workers.

In March 1 964, one out of

every four unemployed persons was classified as poor.

Members of

poor families, no matter what the age group, were more likely to be
unemployed than fami l y members of nonpoor families.

Among the heads

of poor f amilies, unemployment was three times higher than among the
heads of other families.

Family members of poor households where the

head of the household was unemployed were subject to twice as much
unempl oyment as the family members of nonpoor households whose head
was unemployed.
During the 60's welfare agencies were ineffective in their
attempts to employ the poor.

Employment programs of welfare agencies

were described by Ida R . Hoos as "substituting one kind of substandard
status for another. "

Typical jobs obtained by wel f are recipients, for

example, motel maid, nurse aid, are actual ly a type of disguised unempl oyment because wages received from these jobs are not enough to meet
current l iving standards.

2

However, even though the number of welfare

Facts and quotations in this paragraph taken f rom Ida R. Hoos,
Retraining the Work Force (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
Cal ifornia Press, 1967), p. 195.

7

cases cancelled was low, and types of work obtained seemed unsatisfactory, intangibles such as self-confidence and experience were gained.
Many seemingly demeaning jobs were not below the aspiration levels of
trainees; thus, if the wage levels of these jobs were raised, the
3
trainee could have become self-sufficient.
Investment in human capital, such as manpower programs, is the
reason for declines in poverty in the United States, says D. O. Sewell .
According to Mr. Sewell, the remaining poverty in the United States is
present because investment opportunities in human capital have been
4
"thwarted."

Another reason, however, for lack of investment in human

capital is less l iquidity.

Physical capital can be used as collateral

and sold if the borrower defaults.

However, because the investment in

human capital will be embodied in the borrower, there is no collateral
to sell if he defaults because he cannot be sold.

For this reason

investment in human capital must be financed from the resources of the
investor and his family, which severel y restricts people in the lower
income brackets.
Public intervention in the area of investment in human capital
has been promoted for three reasons.

First, it could help improve the

distribution of resources in the economy and thereby increase national
5
Secondly, such investment leads to " externa1 11 benefits for

income.

3

Ibid.

.
4
D. O. Sewell, Training the Poor; A Benefit-Cost Analysis of
Manpower Programs in the U.S. Antipoverty Program (Kingston, Ontario:
Queen's University, 1971), p. 1 .
5

External benefits would be any benefits resulting from the
increased income and standard of living of the people receiving publ ic
funds.

8

society as well as benefits for the individual.

The third reason for

increased interest in investment in human capital is that even though
people feel there should be a more equal redistribution of income,
it goes against the "Protestant Ethic" to merely give people money.
This idea is reflected in the executive programs from the "War on
Poverty" of the Johnson Administration up to and including N ixon's
"Workfare" or Familiy Assistance Plan.

It is easy to see why programs

of education and vocational training which have a potential for
bettering a person's earning ability are so important when the
objective is to change people from poor to nonpoor "through their
6
own efforts .11
Retraining is different from normal vocational training.
Retraining grows out of a need at a certain place and time.

Voca-

tional training is more 9r less permanent while retraining programs
are discontinued when their purpose is fulfilled. 7
The Area Redevelopment Act (ARA) of 1961 was the beginning of
employability programs.

The ARA was enacted under pressure of mount-

ing technological job dislocations.

Over $4.5 million was authorized

under this act for vocational training of unemployed or underemployed
persons in specific "redevelopment areas . "

The ARA was of limited import-

ance, however, because funds were limited to "redevelopment areas,"

6
Quotations in this paragraph taken from Sewell, Training the
Poor; A Benefit-Cost Analysis of Manpower Programs in the U . S. Anti
poverty Program (Kingston, Ontario: Queen's University, 1971), p. 3-4.
7

Einar Hardin and Michael E. Borus, The Economic Benefits and
Costs of Retraining (Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company,
1 971) ' p. 3 .

9
and support allowances were limited to only sixteen weeks.

8

The

Community Work and Training Program (CWf) of 1962 was the beginning
of nation-wide employability programs.
for the states.

9

The cwr program was optional

Federal funds were not supplied directly, but it was

the beginning of Federal involvement in welfare recipients employability
problems.

8

Grant Venn, Man, Education and Work (American Council on
Education: Washington, D . C ., 1964), p. 119.
9
Illinois Department of Public Aid, WIN Phase II; County
Department Manual (Springfield, Illinois, 1971), p. 5.

CHAPTER II

MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING ACT

History of MDTA
The Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) of 1962 was
next in the line of Federal employability programs and grew to be
bigger and more complex than either AR.A or CWT and quickly absorbed
them.

The MDTA courses could be established in all labor markets

and they could last up to fifty-two weeks.
was comprised of three titles.
three years.

11

10

The original MDTA act

Titles II and III were to last

Title I was permanent and made the Secretary of Labor

responsible to the President for an annual report.

The Secretary's

report was to cover "l abor market balances and imbalances, impact of
automation and technology and the occupational structure of the work
force. "

Title II concerns the unemployed and underemployed with pro-

visions that included those sixteen to twenty-two years ol d but only
those nineteen to twenty-two years old were eligible for training
allowances.

Skill surveys and analyses of supply and demand were

also part of this act.

Title III states that the Secretary of Labor

lOHardin and Borus, The Economic Benefits and Costs of
Retraining, p. 6 .
11Hoos, Retraining the Work Force, p. 1 97 .

10
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must make reports to Congress of MDTA's progress.

More important,

the Secretary of Labor was given the power to enter into agreements
with qualified groups to start on- the-job training programs.
December 1 96 3 amendments to MDTA broadened youth-training
allowances and authorized special retraining cl asses for them, plus
relaxing some requirements for adults as to how much they could earn
during training and raised the training all owances.

Also, the 1963

amendments permitted training of the f unctionall y il literate.

12

Furthermore, the 1963 amendments authorized payment of allowances
over a greater length of time so trainees could obtain minimal educational skill s. 13
The Manpower Act of 1965 increased allowances again and .
In 1 965 MDTA obtained

allowed reimbursements for corrnnuting costs.

14
permanent and f iscal stabil ity and officially absorbed the ARA.
New amendments in 1 966 added special courses for older workers,
increased emphasis on hard-core unemployed and experimental courses
for inmates of correctional institutions.

The 1968 amendments

extended retraining programs until 1 97 2 and called for use of man15
.
.
power training
sk"ll
i
centers.

1

2ir ardin

and Borus, The Economic Benefits and Costs of

Retraining, p. 7 .
13
Hoos, Retraining the Work Force,
1

p.

202 .

4ttardin and Borus, The Economic Benefits and Costs of
Retraining, p. 7 .
l5 Ibid.

12

Locally, MOT A revolves around the public employment office
and the vocational school system.

In starting MDT A programs, the

employment office first determines what occupations are in need of
new employees and makes referrals to training courses.

16

They then

pay the trainee's training and subsistance allowances and provide
job development, placement and follow-up services.
need for income maintenance was a first for MDT A.

17

Recognizing the
Also, experience

and family status were introduced by MDTA as criteria for eligibility.

18

The MDTA was the beginning of a "partnership" between the U.S. Depart
ment of Labor and the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare;1 9
The role o f HEW in MDTA programs i s t o provide training facilities
and instructors, develop training curricula and methods, and evaluate
the progress of the trainees.

Welfare agencies have had their powers

taken away from them in manpower fields.
reasons.

20

This was done for two

First, Congress did not like the progress of the programs

started under 1962 legislation and the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act
that were run entirely by welfare agencies.

Secondly, Congress

wanted all manpower programs run by the same agency.

16

There was some

Hoos, Retraining the Work Force, p . 197 .

17

Ibid . , p. 1 9 8 .

18

aardin and Borus, The Economic Benefits and Costs of
Retraining, p. 7.
19
20

Hoos, Retraining the Work Force,p. 197 .
Weber, Cassell and Ginsburg, ed. , Manpower, p. 146

13
discontent over this change because some people thought that only
welfare personnel could really handle and deal with welfare recipients and their problems; that strictly focusing on employment was
not good; and finally, that welfare recipients would have to deal
with still another set of counselors.

21

Financing o f MDTA
In August of 1962 the first funds were allocated to MOTA and
amounted to $161,865,353.

By 1965, the total amount allocated to

MOTA was over $650 million.

During 1964 and 1965 half of the funds

went to training allowances and the rest went to costs of equipment
rental, supplies and teacher s ' salaries.
b etween states was uneven, however.

Distribution of funds

Sixteen states accounted for 71

percent of all the money allocated to MDTA.
had been approved for occupational training.

By 1966, 450,000 persons
Of this number, 387,000

were institutional and 62,000 were enrolled in on-the-job training.
By 1965, 600 specific areas were covered in MDTA training programs. 22
The MOTA was originally created to retrain heads of households who were experienced but displaced because of technological and
23
economic change.

Besides helping the displaced, long-term employed

21
Ibid.
22
Facts about MDTA in this paragraph taken from, Hoos,
Retraining the Work Force, p. 201.
23

Garth L. Mangum, Contributions and Costs of Manpower
Development and Training (a Joint Publication , Ann Arbor: The
University of Michigan, Detroit : Wayne State University, and
Washington, D. C.: National Manpower Policy Task Force, 1967),
p. 7.

14
adult, MDTA has tried to help with other problems, such as the school
dropout and the competitively disadvantaged.
the need of the economy.

However, it has not met

It is called a "Band-Aid" program because

it is remedial in nature, reaching only those that the education system
cannot.

24

The MDTA has succeeded onl y in helping the better-prepared

poor, those with an education past the eighth grade and the more motivated.

It has not helped those with eighth grade education or less,

older workers, rural unemployed and underemployed and the ghetto poor.
In the beginning empl oyment service interviewers chose onl y those
applicants with the most potential to refer to training programs.
"Creaming" was done to give MDTA a good name so it could be expanded.

25

Garth L. Mangum points out that many at the local l evel complained
that MDTA was becoming "just another poverty program.1126

Local offi-

cials would settl e for meeting labor shortages and upgrading the l abor
f orce.

They hoped the disadvantaged would be included in the total

population served.
The Act originated a new procedure in the area of training.
All training classes were to be newly developed, and no one could be
referred to an already existing course.

27

These new training course

requirements of MDTA were good in principle because they allowed far
more personalized training programs.

24

They did not work in fact,

Ibid. , p . 7 3 .

25
Hoos, Retraining the Work Force, p. 202.
26
Mangum, Contributions and Costs of Manpower Development and
Training, p . 7 .
27
Hoos, Retraining the Work Force, p. 198.

15

however, because there was no way to be sure a training program
produced everything it was supposed to produce.

28

Institutional and OJT Training
Although institutional training was found to be better than
on-the-job training (OJT) for particular occupations, OJT was better
29
.
in an overall comparison.

Earnings levels of institutionally-trained

men were greater than o.rr-trained men, but because costs of institutional training were higher than o.rr, the cost-benefit ratios for
OJT were better.

30

On-the-job training also proved to be the best

training program as well as the �est overall program for women.

31

Mangum suggests expanding the OJT programs and making sure that new
slots go to those that employers would not otherwise hire.

32

On- the-

job training is ad ministered by the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau
of Apprenticeship and Training to try and gain labor's trust.

33

Organ-

ized labor was originally against OJT because they felt that the supply
of skilled labor was adequate, and an oversupply would force wages
down.

34

Private employers were against OJT originall y because they

28Ihid.
29
sewell, Training the Poor; A Benefit-Cost Analysis of
Manpower Programs in the U.S. Antipoverty Program, p. 1 09 .
30
ibid.
31
b . d..!_ ., P· 108 .
!...
3
angum, Contributions and Costs of Manpower Development and
Training, p. 85.

2M

33
Hoos, Retraining the Work Force, p. 200.
34
Ibid.

r
\

I

16
were afraid of the governmental control needed to make it work.

35

Vocational educators also objected to OJT because they said it was
an intrusion of the Secretary of Labor into the field o f education.

36

On-th-job training has benefits that institutional training does
37
not have.

On the average, OJT results in larger increases in

average earnings levels.

In spite of the objections to it, OJT was

supposed to be the major method of retraining for those threatened
by skill obsolescence or less-than-full time work.

But because of

the ease of starting institutional training, OJT was neglected
during the beginning of MDTA and also during subsequent years.

38

Objectives of MDTA
Certain potential and identi fiable objectives of MDTA can be
outlined as follows :

(1) Facilitating employment o f the unemployed;
(2) Reducing poverty;
(3) Lessening in flationary pressures;
(4) Meeting labor shortage;
(5) Upgrading the labor force;
39
(6) Revamping traditional institutions.

35
Ibid.
36
rbid.
37

Sewell, Training the Poor; A Benefit Cost Analysis of
Manpower Programs in the U.S. Antipoverty Program, p. 109.
38

Hoos, Retraining the Work Force, pp. 199-200.

39
Mangum, Contributions and Costs of Manpower Development and
Training , p. 7.

17
Objective number five, however, has never become a specific objective
in practice.

Keeping these objectives in mind, we can see four policy

questions that must be answered in determining the future of the MDTA
program.

They are as follows:
(1) Should the program objectives emphasize upgrading
the labor force or rehabilitating the disadvantaged;
(2) What are the relative advantages and what should be
the balance between insti tutional training and OJT;
(3) What should be the relative federal and state roles
in policy and operation;
(4) Is a permanent program needed and what should be its
40
nature and size?

Review of MDTA Studies
Various surveys and s tudies have been done to try and answer
some or all of the above questions.

For example, a survey by Ribich

and the Institute for Defense Analysis shows that expenditures for
vocational training do more to increase earnings potential of the
poor than does general education. 41

Many social benefit-cost analyses

have been done to shed some light on training programs.
In West Virginia, Cain and S tromsdorfer studied men and women
graduates of an MDTA training program. 42

Net present value or benefit

of training over a ten-year period, using both ten p ercent and five
percent discount rates, were calculated and compared to the costs for
40
Ibid.
41

Sewell, Training the Poor; A Benefit-Cost Analysis of
Manpower Programs in the U.S. Antipoverty Program, p. S.
42
Einar Hardin , "Benefit-Cost Analysis of Occupational Training
Programs: A Comparison of Recent Studies," in Benefit-Cost Analysis of
Manpower Policies, ed. by G . G . Somers and W . D. Wood (Queen ' s Univer
sity at Kingston, Ontario : Industrial Relations Centre, 1969), p. 112.

18
men, women, and the average graduate using the ten percent discount
rate.

Using the five percent discount rate gave $ 3, 985 for men, $80
Costs per trainee

for women and $1, 990 for the average graduate.

were $918 for a man, $526 for a woman and $ 787 for the average graduate.

Cain and Stromsdorfer report benefit-cost ratios of 10.5 for

men, 2.7 for women and 9.3 for the average graduate.
Stromsdorfer, using the same data but different analysis tech
niques, obtained economic benefits of $828 for men and $336 for women.43
These figures, according to Stromsdorfer, remained constant for the
entire service life of the trainee.

Using the above cost estimates,

Stromsdorfer calculated rates of return of 90 percent for men and 64
percent for women, but did not give any benefit-cost ratios.
In Michigan, Hardin and Borus studied institutionally and
occupationally-oriented training pr�grams. 44

The study was designed

to measure effects of training on (1) national product, (2) disposable
income of trainees, and (3) government outlays and receipts.

The

Borus and Hardin study is the only study to make estimates on what
impact class length had on results of training.

They· dete�mined .that

class length did have an effect on benefit-cost ratios.

Their findings

showed that short courses had better benefit-cost ratios than did long
courses.

Using discount rates of ten percent and four pereent with a

service life of ten years, short class benefit-cost ratios were 4.2
and 5.5 respectively, while benefit-cost ratios for long classes

43�.
44
rbid., pp. 113-116.

19

were small or negative.

Additional training did not increase

earnings enough to offset large increases in costs of longer
training courses.

The overall benefit-cost ratio for Michigan

was 1.2 using a ten-year service life and a ten percent discount
rate.
After reweighing in accordance with the estimated composition of Michigan training according to course duration, Hardin and
Borus get an increase in the benefit-cost ratio of 1. 5 .

As a con-

clusion to their study, Hardin and Borus made several recommendations
for future training programs:
(1) Continue occupational training of adult workers.
(2) Emphasize short classes rather than long ones.
(3) Expand training in sub-groups, e.g. , race, sex,
education.
(4) Spend more money on short courses for women, whites,
those with few years of schooling, low earners,
welfare recipients, health care and miscellaneous
sales and service occupations rather than on factory
or auto repair occupations.
(5) Contract medium or long training courses regardless
of other considerations. 45
These recorranendations would also hold for training programs in other
states say the authors.

Finally, the authors feel that even though

there have been changes in tax rates, training allowances, organization and administration or programs, they believe the basic relationships are the same today.

45

They also think that the introduction of

Hardin and Borus, The Economic Benefits and Costs of
Retraining, pp. 188-190.

20
on-the-job training and other types o f new training techniques will
not make their findings obsolete because institutional training is
still a major part of MDTA.
In another benefit-cost study done by Borus in Connecticut,
he used several different assumptions concerning the use of skills
learned in the courses to calculate a broad range of ratios.

Benefit-

cost ratios were then calculated using a five percent discount rate and
a ten-year service life, adjusted for out-migration from the trainingrelated occupation, and were found to range from 73.3 to 137.3 {_§j£).
Short classes were found to be more attractive to the trainees because
46
they required less capital investment by the trainees.
In Massachusetts, Page studied 907 trainees and computed benefitcost ratios for them.

Using a ten percent discount rate and a 35-year

service life, he obtained a ratio of 6 .2.47
Einar Hardin attempts to put all the studies on a comparable
basis.

To do this he makes three assumptions:
(1) The annual benefits in the first year after
training remain unchanged for a total of ten
years then become zero;
(2) Social discount rate used is ten percent;
(3) Social gains estimated as differences in earnings
between trainees and non-trainees, disregard g
�g
vacuum, displacement and multiplier effects.

46Hardin, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Occupational Training
A Comparison of Recent Studies, p. 112.
Programs:
47Ibid.
48vacuum effect: job vacancy left when a worker moves to a
new job; Displacement effect: new workers taking jobs of older workers;
Multiplier effect: new jobs resulting from the filling of one job
vacancy. Ibid., pp. 113-114.
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Two alternative assumptions were used to make Borus' results comparable.

Alternative I was trainees who use training gain $500; those

who .do..:not::ua� training gain nothing, and the probability of a trainee
using training is 0.67, thus benefits to society annually will be
$335.

Alternative II was that there is a 0.67 chance that an enrollee

will use training; only graduates are assumed to use training; the
dropout rate is ten percent; and the social cost of training is $346,
which was taken from Hardin and Borus ' study for short classes.
Earnings data for non-trainees and dropouts comes from Borus ' study.
Tab.Le I shows the results. 49
Sewell believes that the increase in salaries obtained by
trainees over non-trainees may have been due to the job placement
efforts of MDTA officials and not due to the training, because MDTA
50
officials are obligated to find jobs for completers.

He also feels

that women brought the rating of institutional training down because
they lacked motivation.5 1
According t o Sewell, if the objective o f training is t o raise
the earnings level of women, they should go to OJT, because if they
participate, it can be assured they are committed to the labor force
more so than women who undertake institutional training.

49
Hardin, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Occupational Training
Programs : A Comparison of Recent Studies, p. 113.
50

Sewell, Training the Poor; A Benefit-Cost Analysis of
Manpower Programs in the U.S. Antipoverty Program, p. 108.
51 !Eil., p. 109.
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TABLE 1
ECONOMIC BENEFITS AND COSTS FOR SOCIETY
ATTEMPTED RECONCILIATION OF RESULTsa

Author
And
Group

Annual
Benefits
Per Trainee

Initial
Cost Per
Trainee

Annual
Benefits
In Percent
Of Cost

Benefits
Costs

Cain and
Stromsdorfer
Men
Women
Both Sexes

918
527
787

108.8
36.4
93.5

6.7
2.2
5.7

828
336

918
527

90.2
63.8

5.5
3.9

976
-57

346
1,665

282.1
-3.4

251
316

1, 272
1,289

19.7
24.5

$1,008
192
736

$

Stromsdorfer
Men
Women
Hardin and
Borus
60-200 Hours
201-1,920 Hours
All Course
Lengths
b
Reweighted

17.3
(-0.2)
1.2
1. 5

Borus
Alternative I
Alternative II
Page

335
818

(346)
(346)

4.46

698

( 96. 8)
(236 .4)

(5. 9)
(14. 5)

63.9

3. 9

aBased on a discount rate·of 10 percent and a 10-year
service life.
b

Weights based on the estimated distribution of Michigan
trainees according to course length (60-200, 201-600, 601-1200 and
1,201-1920 hours.
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Because of procedures used to select only the best applicants
for training (referred to as creaming), only those most likely to
succeed were chosen for MDTA projects.

Thus, conclusions drawn from

these benefit-cost analyses are of limited interest to anti-poverty
52
programs.

Also, Sewell feels that past benefit-cost analyses are

suspect as far as making policy decisions from them because data
used in the analyses were taken from time periods before substantial
5
changes were made in the programs. 3

52Ibid., p. 7.
53

Ibid., p. 6-7.

CHAPTER III
WORK INCENTIVE PROGRAM
History of WIN
The most recent retraining program for welfare recipients
came about in 1 9 6 7 as a result of congressional amendments to the
Social Security Act.
Program (WIN) .S4

The new program was called the Work Incentive

The WIN program developed from a number of differ

ent approaches to training and employing public aid recipients. SS
Title V of the Economic Opportunity Act of 19 64 outlined the basic
program that is part of the WIN program.

Congress enacted Law 90-

248 on January 2, 19 68 called the 1119 67 Amendments to the SSA" which
established the Work Incentive Program. S 6

The Work Incentive Program

is the most ambitious plan for rehabilitating and employing welfare
recipients in the history of the AFDcS 7 program. SB

The bill creating

the WIN program did not meet with unanimous acceptance when it was
passed.

The "thirty and

a

�third" provision, for example, was more

54Arnold Wieber, Frank Cassell and Woodrow L. Ginsburg, ed.,
Public-Private Manpower Policies (Madison, Wisconsin: Industrial
Relations Research Association, 19 6 9), p. 14S .
55Illinois Department of Public Aid, WIN, p. .
S
S 6Ibid., p. 7.
57Aid to Families of Dependent Children.
58weber, Cassell and Ginsburg, ed., Public-Private Manpower
Policies, p. 14 S.
24

25
liberal than the president had asked for in his original request.
He had asked for only a $50 exemption per family.

59

The House

committee studying the WIN program in 1 967 said that WIN should
reverse the trend of increasing welfare roles, although it would
be costly at first.

In fiscal 1969 the $30 incentive payment cost

$129 million and the "thirty and a third" provision cost $20 million.
The Senate agreed that the bill was needed but changed it
substantially.

The bill then went to conference where it was put

into its final form.

Wilbur Mills (D. A�k.), chairman of the House

Ways and Means Committee, said he was very much in favor of the bill
because it was a change from the dole system.60

In the Senate, on

the other hand, liberals were against the bill.

They disagreed with

provisions in the public assistance section agreed to by the conferees.

Fred R . Harris (D. Okla.) , threatened to lead a filibuster

to put off action until early 1968.

The liberals were outmaneuvered

61
on December 14th and the bill passed.
Emphasis in the WIN program is on moving recipients from the
welfare roles into self-support.

62

The Work Incentive Program intro-

duced, for the first time, incentives to participate and accept

D. Co:

5 9congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. VXXIII (Washington,
Congressional Quarterly Service, 1 967, pp. 902-903.
60
Ibid., p. 909.
61
Ibid., p. 913
6

2weber, Cassell and Ginsburg, ed., Public-Private Manpower
Policies, p. 149.
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employment.

Incentives included $30 cash payments monthly and a

thirty and a third income disregard feature. 63

The WIN program

also provided sanctions for those who were supposed to participate but did not.

Manpower services are more extensive for the

64
because the people trained will need
WIN program than for MDTA
more help since they are more disadvantaged.

Most WIN trainees,

6
though, will end up in the same type of programs as MDTA trainees. 5
Leonard J. Hausman does not believe WIN will achieve fantastic
results.

He does believe, however, that it will make trainees more

employable.

Hausman feels that some WIN graduates will earn more

than MDTA graduates because of "novel" training programs, like the
"New Careers" program, preparing them for highly paid sub-profes
sional jobs and highly paid OJT programs.

66

Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) and Department of
Labor (DOL) responsibilities
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare is responsible
for pre-referral supportive services, training expenses and continuing
social services while DOL is the program agent.

The Department of

Labor is responsible for manpower and employment services, which are

63
Illinois Department of Public Aid, WIN, p. 7.
64
Weber, Cassell and Ginsburg, eds., Public-Private Manpower
Policies, p. 149.
65
!.lli.·

66
Ibid.
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education, training, placement and follow-up; but because of the
relationship between HEW and DOL, few opportunities for participants, and deficiencies in the preparation and activities within
the program itself, the movement from AFDC to WIN to employment
has not been smooth.
The WIN program prior to 1 971 was disappointing because
there were fewer than expected placements, a low reduction in grant
levels due to employment, and a low reduction in AFDC recipients.

67

New Changes in WIN
To correct WIN deficiencies, Senator Talmadge introduced the
1971 amendments that became Public Law 72-223 on December 28, 1 97 1.

68

The amendments introduce an important change by requiring inter-agency
The "new"

participation in both planning and operational functions.

WIN program relies very strongly on cooperation between agencies.
Highlights of the 1 971 amendments are listed in Tabl� 2. 6

9

Congress increased emphasis on employment by mandating participation in areas where there were significant numbers of AFDC recipi70
ents.

New to manpower programs is the opportunity for AFDC mothers

to participate. 71

The treatment of mothers in the WIN program is

67Illinois Department of Public Aid, WIN, p. 7.
68
Ibid., p. 8.
69

Ibid.

0
7 Ibid., p. 7.
71weber, Cassell and Ginsburg, ed., Public-Private Manpower
Policies, p. 148.
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TABLE 2
HIGHLIGHTS OF 1971 AMENDMENTS
(1) Insure that welfare recipients are provided the services they
need, including child care, to participate effectively in the
Work Incentive Program.
(2) Emphasize employment-based rather than institutional training
under the program.
(3) Relate institutional training much more closely to actual jobs
available.
(4) Set priorities for participation in the Work Incentive Program,
giving high priority to mothers who volunteer to participate in
the program.
(5) Ease the fiscal burden on the states by increasing Federal
matching from 80 to 90 percent for expenses under the Work
Incentive Program and from 75 to 90 percent for child care,
family planning, and other services needed to permit an
individual to participate in the WI N program. Often, states
will be able to put up their entire 10 percent matching in
kind, so this increase in the matching percent should enable
them to make significant progress in developing these needed
services.
(6) Institute an orderly registration procedure for participation
in the WIN program and make a number of other changes to improve
the operation of the program.

handled locally but is similar to the treatment they normally receive.
The most important asset to the WIN program is the opportunity for
local administrators to carry it out.
.

72
Ibid., p. 147.

.

.
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CHAPTER IV
HYPOTHESES AND DA TA
Hypotheses
At first it would seem that the MDTA program would provide a
welfare recipient with the best chance to become self-sufficient, if
for no other reason than the MDTA program's being much more mature
than the WIN program.

The MDTA program has been around long enough

to have established firm lines of communication between program
officials, Washington, public aid agencies and the community.

Like

wise, the MDTA personnel should be well acquainted with the program
and its complexities.

From attractive benefit-cost ratios, presented

in an earlier part of this paper, we have seen that the MDTA program
has produced desirable results.
The WIN program is relatively new to the continuum of man
power programs emanating from Washington.

Its newness should n o t

hinder i t , however, because its designers used the best parts of
previous programs, as well as some new thoughts, in their attempt
to make a successful manpower program.

There are two main reasons,

besides its formidable heritage, why the WIN program should produce
better results for welfare recipients than the MOTA program.

First,

the WIN program is solely for those on public aid; secondly, i t is
a novel use of a team of counselors to help the public aid trainee.

29
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Possibly the biggest asset this program has is the use of the team
approach in providing services to the WIN participants.

Each team

is composed of five members, each with a specific duty to perform
to help the public aid recipient in overcoming any barriers in his
movement to self-sufficien cy.

The members of a WIN team are a

manpower specialist, coach, counselor, work training specialist and
team clerk.

A member of this team unique to manpower programs is

the coach.

He i s a resident of the local community, and his func

tion is to see that the trainee adjusts to the little, and sometimes
overlooked, obstacles to becoming work-oriented.
Because the WIN program is specifically a welfare recipient
program and because of its unique team approach, it seems reasonable
to believe that it would provide a welfare recipient with the best
chance of successfully obtaining work and being better off financi
ally than he would have been if he was solely dependent on public aid.
This paper will test the hypothesis that the WIN program produces
public aid recipient graduates who are finan cially more successful
than public aid recipients who graduate from the MDTA program.
Success for the purposes of this paper was measured by the ratio of
income received from employment after completing training, compared
to the public aid income the trainee would have received if he was
solely dependent on public aid.

Also, the hypothesis will be tested

that success is dependent on a trainee ' s age, number of dependents,
number of years he receive� public assistance before entering training,
number of years of work experience he had before entering training ,
his marital status, race, sex, and finally, which program he_; completed.
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Data for this analysis was gathered from Illinois Department
of Public Aid case records from St. Clair County in Southern Illinois.
Two hundred cases were picked at random from W IN and M.DTA files, 100
from each program.

To eliminate the possible effect of changing

unemployment rates in the county, only trainees completing training
in 1968 and 1969 were chosen for use in this study.

By doing this,

all trainees chosen faced approximately the same unemployment rates
when they entered the job market.

All the names of trainees com

pleting WIN training in 1968 and 1969 were placed on similar-sized
slips of paper and placed in a container.
drawing 100 names from the container.

The sample was chosen by

The same method was used to

select the MIYl'A sample.
In order to investigate the above hypothesis , a measure of a
welfare recipient ' s success, a fter completing training in either o f
the two manpower programs studied, was needed.

To meet this need a

ratio was devised that compares total income of a trainee after
training to total income a trainee would receive if he were totally
dependent on welfare for his income.

This is a logical estimate of

success because it measures how much better off financially a person
is by working than by receiving public aid.

A man would not be likely

to take a job that paid less than what he could make on public aid
because of the 100 percent tax rate on his earnings, and a woman would
always be better off working because of the less than 100 percent tax
rate on her earnings.

The expected ratios for those obtaining jobs

should be greater than one.

A ratio of one means that the tra inee did

32
not obtain a job and was still receiving public aid.
there were ratios less than one.

Unexpectedly ,

This is impossible to explain

without interviewing the individuals involved.

Possibly, pride in

working for a living or case worker error was involved.

73
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•ro lighten their work loads some caseworkers will cancel
male cases rather than explain consequences and alternatives to them
and cancel female cases without explaining thirty and a third benefits.

CHAPTER V
INTERPRETATION OF DATA
Test of First Hypothesis
A one-way analysis of variance was used to determine if
there was a statistically significant difference between the WIN
trainees ' success ratios and the MDTA trainees ' success ratios.
The F ratio computed was 0 . 58 and was not significant at any
level tested. 7

4

This means that there is no statistically signi-

ficant difference between the success ratios of the two programs
and, therefore, no difference between the success of WIN trainees
and MDTA trainees.

My hypothesis must then be rejected.

It is

interesting to note that the MDTA program not only placed more
people in this sample in jobs--31 as compared to 28 for WIN--but
also placed three trainees in jobs that resulted in success ratios
less than one while WIN placed only two in such jobs.

These, how-

ever, are not statistically significant differences.
Test of Second Hypothesis
To examine what factors affect the success of a WIN or MDTA
program trainee that completes training, variables were chosen that

74 0.

5 percent, l percent, 2 . 5 percent and 5 percent levels
used throughout study.
33
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were thought to have a strong influence on these people.

Stepwise

linear regression analysis was used to determine the effect of these
variables on the success of the sample of trainees used previously.
The success ratio mentioned earlier was used as the dependent vari
able.

The success ratio of a trainee is thought to be dependent on

trainee ' s age (A) , number o f dependents (D) , the number o f years a
trainee receives public assistance before entering training (Y) ,
number o f years o f work experience the trainee had before entering
training (W), the trainee ' s marital status (M) , his race (R) , his
sex (S), and finally, which program the trainee completed (C).
The last five variables were treated a s dummy variables.

A

one-way analysis of variance was made for each variable to determine
if there was a statistically significant difference between the
sample drawn from WIN and that drawn from MDTA for that variable.
Two variables were determined to have significant differences between
the sample populations.

The first was previous employment history

with an F ratio of 1 0 .05 and was significant at all levels tested.
The second was sex with an F ratio of 14.45 also significant at all
levels tested.
It is interesting to note that the WIN program trainees
averaged more work experience than the MDTA program trainees.

Since

data was taken from the beginning of the WIN program's life, it is
reminiscent o f criticisms of MDTA in its infancy.

The point could

be made that WIN was involved in "creaming", and if it had actually
lived up to its philosophies, it would not have fared as well as it

;3 5

Of cour s e ,

d i d i n this test.

from the data p r e s ented her e , there

is no way of c onfirming that the WIN officials we r e " c r e aming.

11

The s e cond variable with a statistically s ignific ant diffe r ence between samples tested was s e x .

T h e MDTA program,

it

s e e m s , had a substantially higher number of women than did the
WIN program.

In the sample u s e d h e r e ,

MDTA trainees were women, while only
the WIN sample.

59,

or over half,

of

33 trainees were women in

The reason for this i s twofold.

F i r s t , all able -

bodied men r e c eiving a s s istance and c l a s s ified as the father or head
of the family must,

by law, be referred t o WIN; and secondly,

women have difficulty finding child care that WIN officials feel is
adequate.

T o be referred to MDTA there are no child care requir e -

ments that must be met,

but there are r ather strict requirements

for child c a r e that must be met before a woman with children can be
referred to WIN.
Taking note of the above differences between the populations ,
the actual tes ting of the hypothe s i s gave totally unexpected r e sults .
( Shown here with the expected signs of the variables in parenth e s e s . )

s . R.

=

f

� ( -) ,

D( - ) ,

Y(-),

W(+), M(+), R ( + ) , S( - ) ,

D

C(+

A - Age

D - Number of dependents

Y

- Number of years a trainee r e c e ived public a s s istance
before entering training

W - Number of years of work experience the trainee had
before entering training
M - Marital status
R - Race
S - Sex

C - Program trainee completed
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The first variable introduced was public aid history (Y) and its 1
test was significant at the five percent level.

However , the F

ratio for the equation was not significant at any levels tested.
Public aid history continued to be significant at the five percent
level up to and including step four, but none of the additional
variables were significant at the levels tested, and likewise, the
F ratios for all remaining equations were not significant.

A final

observation in this analysis is that race was not entered into the
computation .

Its F level to enter was below the pre-set level pro

vided for in the computer program.

Therefore, this hypothesis must

also be rejected.
The data collected lent itself to two more tests that were
done out of curiosity.

First, the hypothesis was tested that white

trainees were more successful than black trainees.

The success ratios

for those obtaining jobs were d ivided into two groups by race.

A one

way analysis of variance was used to determine if there was a differ
ence.

The computed F ratio was 0 . 04 and was not significant at any

level tested, meaning that there was no discrimination because of
race in this sample.

Second, the hypothesis that men are more success

ful than women was tested.

As before, those obtaining jobs were divided

into two groups, this time by sex.

Again, a one-way analysis of vari

ance was used to determine if there was a difference between the two
groups.

The F ratio was 1 . 40 and was not significant at any level

tested.

This hypothesis must also be rejected since there were no

differences between the success of men and women.
Please refer to Appendix for complete results.

CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
Final Conunents
The interpretation of the data in Chapter V led to the
rejection of both major hypotheses tested in this paper.

This

means that graduates of the WIN program were not more successful
financially than graduates of the MDTA program as was expected.
There could be at least two reasons for this to occur.

First,

the team approach used by WIN is not really a better way to treat
welfare recipients, or secondly, the number of highly skilled and
high-paying jobs that WIN graduates were qualified for were few,
and admission to them closed to welfare recipients .

Graduates of

WIN, then, had to compete with MDTA graduates for jobs that both
were equally qualified for, and, thus, superior training programs
made little difference.

Further tests would have to be condu cted

to determine the true reason why the WIN program graduates were not
more successful than MDTA graduates.
The rejection of the second hypothesis is equally difficult
to explain.

The eight independent variables used were chosen because

it was thought that they would exert a strong influence on the trainee ' s
motivation.

Statistically, at least, no strong influence was present.
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The insignificance of the variable representing the program which
the trainee completed did support the findings in the test of the
first hypothesis although there was no di fference in success achieved
by either WIN or MDTA graduates.

Again, however, it is impossible to

tell why there was no difference between the two programs.

The other

variables and why they did not contribute to the trainee ' s success is
unknown .
vation.

There must be some other factor or factors that affect moti
Possibly, motivation is a separate entity and, at least for

the present, is impossible to quantify.
Suggestions for Further Research
This study was done in a small area o f just one county in the
state.

The first suggestion for further study presented here, there
This

fore, would be to expand the study to include the entire state.

would give results that would be more appropriate for analyzing a
national program.
jects is cost .

Another item o f importance to all gove rnmental pro

The question of how costs o f the WIN program compare

to the benefits o f such a program must eventually be answered.

I f the

costs of the WIN program are greater than those o f the MDTA program
while the benefits remain about the same, it would be wise to invest
more money into the program with the better benefit-cost ratios.

A

final suggestion for further research is that only trainees that
graduated after the Talmadge Amendments went into effect be used in
any future studies.

APPENDIX
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SUMMA RY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE BETWEEN THE SUCCESS RATIOS
FOR WIN AND MDTA TRAINEES

Treatment Group

WIN

MDTA

Sample Size

100

100

Mean

1 . 32

1 .42

Standard Deviation

0 . 94

0 . 91

Sum of Squares
Between Groups

0.5

DF

Mean Square

1

0.5
0.8

Within Groups

170 . 34

198

Total

170 . 84

199

F Ratio
0 .58
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SUMMARY OF STEPWISE LINF.AR REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Sample Size

200

Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

1.

Success Ratio (SR)

1.37

0.93

2.

Age (A)

35.62

16. 94

3.

Number of Dependents (D)

3.4

1.87

4.

Number of Years Received Public
A id Before Training (Y)

3. 54

4.03

5.

Number of Years of Employment
a
Before Receiving Training (W)

1.69

1.14

6.

Marital Status (M)

1.11

0.78

7.

Race (R)

0.58

0.49

8.

Sex (S)

0.46

0.5

9.

Program Completed (C)

0.50

0.50

�I

i

a

Number of years worked were grouped; 0 (under 1 year),
1 (1-2 years), 2 (3-9 years), 3 (over 10 years) .
Step Number

Variable Entered
And Its Sign

F Ratio

2
R

1

-Y

3

0.01

2

+A

2

0.02

3

-D

2

0.03

4

+c

1.5

0.03

s

1.5

0.04

6

+M

1.4

0.04

7

-w

1.2

0.04

5

-

Variable Number (7) Race, not entered.
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SUMMA RY OF STEPWISE LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS (Cont .)

SR = 1 . 39

+

O . OlA - 0 .05D - 0 .03Y - 0 . 05W + 0 .09M - 0 . 26S
( 1 .01)
( 1 .4)
( 1 . 35)
(0 . 57)
(0 . 99)
(1 .4)

2
R = 0 .04

F = 1.2

t values in parentheses

+

0 . 17C
( 1 . 2)
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